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THE SOVIET-BLOC FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM
NICOLAS SPULBzR*
Foreign trade is a state monopoly in each of the countries of the Soviet bloc.
The sphere of this monopoly encompasses not only all the export and import opera-
tions, which must be concentrated in the hands of state-chartered or designated
agencies, but extends, moreover, to all the economic relations between each of these
countries and the rest of the world, including their international accounts and credits.
The international accounts and the other economic or noneconomic relations with
other countries are handled on the basis of an organic component of the monopoly of
foreign trade, the monopoly of foreign exchange.
The stated tasks of the monopoly of foreign trade are: to ward off capitalist eco-
nomic penetration, to provide "maximum assistance" to domestic capital formation,
and to facilitate the eventual "coordination" of the economic plans of the bloc coun-
tries. The development of foreign trade in each country is dependent on the over-
all economic plan: it is the latter which commands the dynamics of imports, which,
in turn, determine the dynamics of exports. The government decides the volume,
value, structure, and direction of its trade; thus, the monopoly offers maximum
"protection" to the national economy. Tariffs, the key factor in the foreign trade
of the nonbloc economies, play only a secondary role in the bloc countries.
The present article proposes to examine both the structure and the operation of
the monopolies of foreign trade in the countries of the Soviet bloc, focusing in turn
on: (I) organization of these monopolies; (2) their operation within and outside the
bloc; (3) prices and rates of exchange; (4) extent and limitation of bloc-wide attempts
toward coordination of trade and output. A final section summarizes the discus-
sion and suggests some conclusions.
I
In each bloc country, the foreign trade system is headed by the ministry of foreign
trade. The ministry plans all the relevant elements concerning the foreign trans-
actions, in function of the domestic output plan, of various policy considerations, and
of the existing commitments. It prepares and participates in the negotiation of for-
eign trade agreements, and controls and directs the organizations entering in the
field of trade.
Both in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet-bloc countries, where the Soviet organi-
*A.M. 195o, Ph.D. 1952, New School for Social Research. Associate Professor of Economics and
Acting Chairman, Institute of East European Studies, Indiana University. Author, THE ECONOMICS oF
CO.MMUNISr EASTERN EUROPE (1957). Co-editor, RESOURCES AND PLANNING IN EASTERN EUROPE (x957),
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE UNDER THE COMMUNISTS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1957), THE SECOND SOVIET-YUcO-
siAv DISPUTE (1959). Contributor to economic periodicals.
SOVIET-BLOC SYSTEM
zational set-up has been more or less-faithfully copied,1 the ministry is organized into
two types of sections or departments--"functional" and "operational." The usual
functional departments are planning, foreign exchange and finance, contracts, book-
keeping and auditing, arbitration, personnel, and capital construction. The usual
operational departments and/or administrations are import, export, tariffs, transport,
and international forwarding. In various bloc countries, some of the functional or
operational departments are split into two sections-one concerned with the rela-
tions with the bloc, the other with the nonbloc countries.
The key planning department prepares the draft-plan in close contact with the
state planning commission, which transmits it to the state-chartered foreign trade
corporations. The draft is constructed within the directives of the state planning
commission by taking into account the basic proportions planned by it for the
economy as a whole, the existing commercial commitments, the import requirements,
and the foreign exchange available. The draft specifies the volume, prices and
transport cost, structure, and direction of the foreign trade. The importing and
exporting corporations draft, in turn, their specific plans on the basis of the physical
balances (output and its allocations in physical terms) submitted to them by the
producing organizations and their selling and purchasing departments. The corpora-
tions of foreign trade suggest, fit in, or complete modifications of the basic blueprint,
which they present to the planning department of the ministry. The coordinated,
yearly, or long-term (five-seven years) plan can then be established by the ministry
and submitted for final approval to the council of ministries.
Among the other functional departments which have been mentioned above, the
foreign exchange and finance department, which keeps in close contact with the
state bank, concerns itself with balance-of-payments problems. The administrative-
economic department prepares the budget of the ministry and plans and surveys the
expenditure of the foreign trade organs. The contracts department studies market
trends abroad, prepares the projects for interstate negotiations, and drafts instruc-
tions for the foreign trade organizations concerning the carrying out of contracts
after their signature. The accounting and auditing department checks and controls
the financial accounts of the ministry and its organs.
Schematically, the departments for import and export are subdivided into sections
for planning and finance, and into operational sections corresponding to the basic
industrial branches (metallurgy, chemicals, textile, leather, food and agricultural
products, etc.). Each of the sections is, in turn, subdivided by commodities, and in
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the case of a key commodity, also by countries. This is the case in Poland, for
example, for coal, in Rumania for oil, and so on. In some countries, a special depart-
ment for capital goods-distinct from the departments of imports and exports-con-
cerns itself with the import of capital goods. In Poland, for instance, the main sub-
sections of this department are fully-equipped plants, power equipment, machines,
railroad and vehicles, ships and shipping equipment, and agricultural machinery.
The other operational departments concern themselves, as their names indicate, with
the policies and economies of tariffs, transport, and forwarding, and are each sub-
divided into sections for planning, finance, accounting, personnel, etc.
The ministry conducts its domestic activities through foreign trade commissioners
and through the monopolistic corporations. The commissioners are members of the
regional or republican central bodies. They supervise the facilities connected with
foreign trade, propose measures for trade expansion, and survey the application of
the instructions and regulations of the ministry. The monopolistic corporations are
"governmental agencies operating under special status." They are state-owned organi-
zations placed on a "commercial basis." That means that each is an independent
legal entity, organized, as stated, under a separate charter which specifies its endow-
ment by the state for the pursuit of its assigned business.2 Each organization is
expected to produce planned or above-plan profits, in agreement with scheduled
costs and planned profit margins, in carrying out the tasks assigned by the plan
and in transacting purchases and sales at the prices established by the government.
The state does not guarantee their obligations, since they are independent legal
entities. The relation with the production enterprises is that of customer and sup-
plier, regulated by special contracts. Once the over-all economic plan is approved,
these contracts are concluded, within the framework of the plan, by the corporations
and the selling or purchasing organizations of the economic ministries or of the
trusts and "combines," specifying prices and terms of delivery.
Each of the importing, exporting, or fowarding (transport and expedition) corpo-
rations has, in turn, its functional and operational offices following the pattern indi-
cated for the ministry of foreign trade. Basically, the importing and exporting
corporations specialize according to the main industrial branches and their needs,
while their offices specialize, in turn, in one type of commodity. Thus, the main
importing corporations are established in each bloc country for capital goods, basic
raw materials, metals and goods of mass-consumption household appliances, tex-
tiles, food, etc. The main exporting corporations are diversified according to the
principal exports which the country has to offer. In the case of the Soviet Union,
the export corporations handle notably grain (Eksportkhleb), coal (Soiuzugleeks-
port), oil (Soiuznefteksport), lumber (Eksportles), fibers (Eksportlen), as well as
machines, equipment, and finished artides (Tekhnoeksport). In Czechoslovakia, for
instance, the accent is on diversification in the export of fully-equipped plants (Tech-
noexport), heavy machinery and equipment (Strojexport), precision engineering
2 1 V. Gsovsxr, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 380 et $eq. (1948).
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(Kovo), etc., and results in a sharper specialization in these fields. However, in
Bulgaria, the corporations specializing in the sale of various agricultural produce
tend to be more diversifiedY By and large, there are some twenty corporations in
each of the countries of the bloc. In most of these countries, a selling organization
of the cooperatives is also authorized to enter the field of foreign trade, along with
the state corporations.
In each country, a chamber of commerce, which is not directly included in the
system of the ministry of foreign trade, assists the foreign customers in all matters
connected with trade, sends delegations abroad, arranges the participation in foreign-
trade fairs, obtains patents for its citizens, and so on. To it are also attached arbitra-
tion commissions.
The ministry of foreign trade carries on its operations abroad through trade
delegations (in Russian, called torgovye predstavitel'stva-in short, torgpredstva).
The torgpredstva, as these delegations are known in all the bloc countries, are
treated as state delegations and enjoy full diplomatic immunity within the bloc,
since foreign trade is considered by these countries to be a state function. The
torgpredstva control the commercial activity carried on abroad by their national
foreign trade corporations and insure that it conforms to the national laws of the
foreign trade monopoly, grant the documents needed for the agreed commercial
operations, and also study the general business trends in each country with respect
to trade possibilities. In some countries, including the United States, where the
torgpredstva are not accepted as state delegations, the Soviet Union and its various
satellites maintain commercial agencies directly subordinated to their respective min-
istries of foreign trade.
II
The existence of a group of Soviet-type economies has led to the appearance of a
special foreign trade market distinct from the rest of the world market-namely,
the bloc or intraplanned-economies market. The interstate commercial treaties con-
cluded between these countries are based on agreements of "friendship and mutual
aid," and have both a political and commercial aim. The stated political aim is to
help the signatory countries to "construct a communist society in the USSR and
a socialist society in the popular democracies," while the commercial aim to to pro-
vide a well-defined framework for their commercial agreements. The commercial
treaties include the provisions for most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
a See NIcoLAs SPULBR, THE EcoNoMIcs oF COMMuNIST EAs-rER EuRoPF 163 et seq. (1957).
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physical and juridical persons of a signatory power founding themselves in the terri-
tory of the other country, export and import operations, transport of freight or
passengers, and custom duties. They contain further provisions concerning arbitrage
competence, exchange of specialists, organization of trade fairs, and other points of
secondary importance.
Trade agreements for a determined period of one, two, or five years are signed
by the governments of the bloc countries, within the general framework defined by
their commercial treaties. The trade agreements state the value of the envisaged
trade turnover in rubles and specify that the prices of the goods will be "fixed on
the basis of world prices." An adjoining quota list indicates in quantity or value
terms the broad categories of the commodities to be exchanged. The long-term trade
agreements are meant to insure the basic minimum supplies needed for the outputs
scheduled by the so-called "perspective" plans. The yearly agreements are meant
to adjust more concretely the flows of trade to the precise needs of the yearly "opera-
tional" plan. Upon the signature of the agreement, the state banks of the two signa-
tory countries open to each other noninterest-bearing credit accounts for the specified
amount of the trade turnover. For the implementation of this trade, contracts are
then negotiated and eventually concluded between the appropriate foreign trade
corporations of the two countries. These contracts finally specify the quality, assort-
ment, agreed price, date, and place of delivery of each item.
Let us now follow a whole foreign trade operation as it is carried out in practice
within the bloc. On the basis of the plan, contracts are concluded between the ex-
porting corporations and the appropriate domestic organizations selling commodities
earmarked for export. The prices paid by the exporting corporations are the factory
price f.o.b., not including the famous turnover tax (a sales tax with varying levels,
according to the item to which it is applied). For certain scarce commodities, a
special purchase authorization may also be needed. Payment to the producer is done
via the so-called "acceptance" form-i.e., acceptance by the purchasing exporting
corporation of the documents indicating that the goods have been sent to it by the
producer. The commodity is forwarded by the exporting agency to the foreign im-
porting agency via the appropriate channels. The settlement is made through the
system of so-called "incasso with direct payment." The export organization is paid
by its central bank, from the account of the buyer, upon receipt of the export docu-
ments. The bank then sends the documents to the central bank of the importing
country, which, in turn, immediately credits the account of the exporter, and then
presents the documents for collection of payments to the importing organization.
In case of refusal of the buyer to accept the goods, the banks rapidly notify one
another and adjust their accounts accordingly.5
With the nonbloc countries, trade agreements are concluded in the same way, but
the values involved are expressed in the currency of the nonbloc partner, in dollars
' V. F. Popov (ED.), GOSUDARSTVEN-I BANK SSSR 1917-1957 [THE STATE BANK OF THE USSR, x917-
1957] 205 et seq. (1957).
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or in rubles. These are, again, bilateral agreements, with accounts carried in clearing,
just as in the case of the trade within the bloc. The balance of such accounts can
be covered either by gold or foreign exchange, or by the shipment of additional com-
modities, as is also done within the bloc. In countries with which no clearing
accounts are established, the payments are made through the foreign accounts kept
by the central banks with various foreign banks. Whatever the case, the trade settle-
ments with nonbloc countries are done via the, usual letter of credit (and not
through the incasso form). The exporter receives his payment from a specially
agreed bank at the presentation, under specified conditions, of the export documents.
Some triangular arrangements involving one nonbloc and two bloc countries have
been established on the initiative of the Soviet Union. Under one arrangement,
specific Finnish exports to the Soviet Union were offset by given Polish exports to
Finland, in exchange for Soviet exports to Poland. In another case, Burmese exports
to the Soviet Union were offset by Czechoslovak exports to Burma, counterbalancing
Soviet exports to Czechoslovakia.
Up to June 1957, the "clearing ruble" has played only the role of a bookkeeping
unit of account. Since June 1957, the State Bank of the Soviet Union has started to
act as a dearing house for intrabloc multilateral compensations. Given the fact that
the bulk of the bloc trade continues to flow on the basis of bilateral agreements and
through bilateral channels, the amount multilaterally compensable has remained, in
all likelihood, rather small. This amount is built up by purchases above the mini-
mums provided for by the bilateral agreements, purchases of various consumers'
goods, and perhaps by various obligations arising from servicesP Though the
planners of each country might be inclined to retain the manageable system of
bilateral agreements which guarantees them the supply of a given structure and
volume of imports required by their output plans, it is possible that in the future,
some triangular or quadrangular arrangements would be devised, especially for raw
materials, which occupy a decisive place in intrabloc trade. Thus, for instance, Soviet
iron ore exports to Rumania might be offset by Rumanian oil exports to Poland,
counterbalancing in part Polish coal exports to the Soviet Union. Again, such
arrangements might also provide, but still in limited margins, multilaterally com-
pensable balances. In any case, since multilateral compensation means that each
bloc country would stand ready to sell goods against clearing rubles, and since the
case might arise in which some countries would build net export or import sur-
pluses with the whole bloc (over and above their regular bilateral agreements),
some limits must be set to the amount of clearing rubles which each country would
be supposed to accept. This kind of arrangement, similar to the one which prevailed
in the defunct European Payments Union, appears even more compelling in the
bloc, given the planning of both output and foreign trade and the scarcity, by
'All the bloc countries have introduced, since 1957, varying premiums on the official rate of
exchange in connection with payments for services. These rates now diverge significantly from the
rates prevailing in trade.
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definition, of exportable commodities over and above plan. A supplementary, and
probably also necessary, clause might be required to provide for the conversion into
gold of some of the balances built in clearing rubles.
All these various elements-the necessity of insuring planned supplies, and
hence the preference for bilateral arrangements, the scarcity of exportable goods
over and above plan, the necessity of limiting the amounts of freely convertible
clearing rubles, and the need of providing for the conversion of the latter into gold up
to a certain amount-will, along with other factors, continue to keep the multilateral
compensation within narrow margins.
III
As already stated, the bloc importer or exporter pays or receives payment for the
respective goods from his central bank. Payments are made in the domestic currency
-rubles in Russia, zlotys in Poland, korunas in Czechoslovakia, and so on-at the
prevailing rate of exchange. In each bloc country, all gold and foreign exchange
is concentrated in the hands of the central bank, and all foreign accounts are carried
out exclusively through that bank. Each bloc government defines the gold con-
tent of its domestic currency, so that each bloc currency can be expressed in terms
of any other bloc (or nonbloc) currency. However, no foreign currency, be it of
bloc or nonbloc countries, circulates within these countries, and it is strictly prohibited
to take the domestic currency abroad. It is officially stated that the rate of exchange
of these domestic currencies is established in a planned fashion. Actually, the rate
is fixed at an arbitrary level, since neither changes in the domestic wholesale and
retail prices nor changes in the world prices of the goods exported or imported by
these countries affect this planned rate of exchange.1
Since domestic prices are looked upon as an element which can and must be
extensively manipulated in all possible ways in order to meet various planned
objectives, prices reflect only in part the underlying endowment of factors. As a
rule, capital goods are furnished to the economy at various below-cost levels in order
to keep the general price level down, while consumers' goods are charged with
varying levels of turnover tax. Since the rate of exchange is also established at an
arbitrary plateau, the planner of foreign trade is handicapped in trying to ascertain
the efficiency of the foreign trade system as a whole, though he might be able to relate
in a crude manner the profitability of one transaction to that of another. Each
bloc country uses a different method in this field, though all these methods are
qualified by their users themselves as being extremely deficient s
'See V. V. IKONNIKOV (ED.), DENEZHNOE OBRASHCHENIE I KREDIT SSSR [MONaY CIRCULATION AND
CREDIT IN THE USSR] 421-22 (1954).
8 To illustrate the point, let us look more closely at one of these somewhat complicated methods of
computing the profitability of foreign trade. The example is based on Pavel, Pour un juste calcul de la
rentabilite et de l'eff cacite du commerce exterieur [For an Accurate Computation oj the Profitability and
Eff ciency of Foreign Trade], in EruDss ECONOMIQUES cahiers o6-07 (1957). In Hungary, the foreign
trade enterprises use in the case of export operations a so-called "coefficient of foreign exchange," and
in the case of import operations a so-called "coefficient of domestic realization." In the computation of
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Generally, each foreign trade organization has an established "profit norm"--i.e.,
a mark-up ranging from one to fifty per cent of the domestic wholesale price of the
item traded. For an imported good, the mark-up is computed on the basis of
the domestic wholesale price at which the good is sold to an industry. The mark-up
on exported goods is calculated on the interior wholesale price, excluding the turn-
over tax, at which a good is usually sold by a domestic producer to a wholesale
organization. If the price of the commodity sold abroad is, at the official rate of
exchange, below the domestic price, including the profit of the exporting organiza-
tion, the difference is covered by a subsidy from the budget. In order to obtain a
particularly sought-after import, the ministry of foreign trade might enjoin the
trading agencies to sell some exports at a price below cost. However, the trading
agencies will generally try to sell at a profit.
Following a rule against price discrimination agreed upon in i95i , each bloc
country will charge any bloc partner the same price for the same commodity, except
for differences in transport cost. No assurance exists, however, of complete uni-
formity of prices for goods exported by more than one country in the bloc. A
tendency in this direction exists through the mobility of buyers and sellersy As
already stated, the prices at which the goods are traded in the bloc are based on
"world prices." We do not know, however, whether these prices are prevailing in
New York, London, or Bombay, in the same market for all commodities, or in
different markets for different commodities. In establishing the price of a given
commodity, the bloc partners "take into account the price of that commodity prevail-
ing on the capitalist market in usual conditions of supply and demand."'" This pre-
sumably means that the world prices are purged of short-term fluctuations, though it
is not at all clear how the bloc partners can ascertain the "usual conditions of supply
and demand" in the "capitalist markets." The agreed export prices are then kept
unchanged "for at least one year and for the overwhelming majority of commodities
both coefficients, the elements involved are the domestic and foreign prices paid and obtained and the
official rate of exchange. Assume that the rate of exchange is a dollar for 6 forints, and i ruble for 1.5
forints. Assume further that a given commodity is purchased by the exporting enterprise at 1400 forints
and sold for 2oo dollars-i.e., i2oo forints at the official rate of exchange. The coefficient of foreign
exchange is taken to be the ratio of the domestic price to the price obtained, computed at the official
rate--i.e., X400 - 2oo = xr.6. The coefficient is then 16% above parity. If the commodity is sold
for 25o dollars, the coefficient is .93 (14oo -4- 5oo)-i.e., 7% below parity. The lower the coefficient,
the more profitable a transaction is presumed to be. In the ease of imports, if a commodity is purchased
for 2oo rubles and resold for 36o forints, the ruble has been "obtained" at the rate of 1.8 forints. This
figure is called the "domestic rate of realization." Since at the official rate of 1.5 forints, the 2oo rubles
equal only 300 forints, the coefficient of domestic realization is 5.2o (36o - 300 = 1.20), or 2o% above
parity. If the domestic sale price is 279, the coefficient of domestic realization is .93, or 7% below parity.
This time, the operation is presumably considered to be unprofitable. Obviously, since all the magnitudes
involved-domestic price of an exported commodity, domestic price of an imported commodity, and rate
of exchange-are distorted in various ways, these calculations at best allow a comparison between two
foreign trade transactions of a closely related nature, but can hardly serve as an indicator of what is
actually occurring in the foreign trade as a whole.
' See Spulber & Gehrels, The Operation of Trade within the Soviet Bloc, 40 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 140,
145 (1958).
10 KOVRUZHNYKH, IFRmuuN, & PozDNiAxov, op. cit. supra note s, at 39-
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for a series of years."'" Hence, it is possible that at various times, the price constella-
tion in intrabloc trade should diverge in some respects from the price constella-
tion in the world market, even though the former constellation is patterned on the
latter.
The utilization of the world price pattern creates many misgivings for Marxian
economists, since according to Marx, any developed country is always in the posi-
tion of exploiting a less-developed one. In Marxian terms, "an advanced country is
enabled to sell its goods above their value even when it sells them cheaper than the
competing countries,"'" while a less-developed country "may offer more materialized
labor in goods than it receives, and yet it may receive in return commodities cheaper
than it may produce them."' 3 Since 1948, the theory of an implicitly unequal ex-
change (more materialized labor of the underdeveloped area against less labor of
the highly developed country) has been heavily stressed by the Yugoslav Com-
munists in order to suggest that unequal relations might also arise among socialist
states.14  Though the Yugoslavs have been expelled from the bloc and branded
as "revisionists," the question of the utilization of the world price pattern within
the orbit is still high on the agenda of the bloc economists. At various bloc con-
ferences concerning these problems, the Czechoslovak and East German economists
were decidedly in favor of the further utilization of the world price pattern, while
the Hungarians and Rumanians seemed to agree to this solution only with numerous
reservations. Thus, the Czechslovak economist Vladmir Kaigl noted that it would
not be "feasible to build a separate price-system completely severed from the existing
world prices" and suggested that the gulf between the developed and the non-
developed areas be bridged "by other means than an effort to deviate from world
prices." The Rumanian economist Iosif Angel affirmed that the application of
world prices to bloc trade "leads to effects harmful to the economy of industrially
less developed countries."'" However, no one has indicated precisely how these
harmful effects could be avoided by the manipulation of prices in foreign trade.
It is interesting to note that in i95i, the Russians were suggesting that the bloc
countries were ready to set up their own intrabloc price system different in amount
and ratios of the price system prevailing in the world markets. Nothing significant
came out of these early claims, except the correction of world-market prices of short-
run fluctuations. Furthermore, up to now, no one has proposed the adoption
of the Soviet price pattern itself in intrabloc transactions. Such an adoption
would make the ruble figuring in the intrabloc transactions convertible, within the
" Id. at 39-40.
223 K ,L MARx, CAPITAL 278 (Untermann transl. x9og).
" The paradox is presumed to arise from the fact that "capitals invested in foreign trade come in
competition with commodities produced in other countries with lesser facilities of production." Id. at 279.
1' See, e.g., Popovic, 0 ekonomskim odnosima izmedju socijalisti1kih driava [On the Economic
Relations among the Socialist States], Komunist (Belgrade), July 1949.
1 5 Vanak, Rentabilita zahraniniho obchodu [Conference on the Economic Rentability of Foreign
Trade] in 6 POLITI KA EKONOMIA 337 (958); Konference o mezindrodn di1bE prdce v socialistickl
svtovi soustavF [Conference on the International Division of Labor in the World Socialist System], id.
at 383.
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limits of the trade agreements, into goods at the delivery prices prevailing in the
Soivet Union. But the Soviet price pattern is so distorted that presumably neither
the Soviet Union nor the satellites would be able to know who would benefit, and
in what amount, from any foreign trade transaction.' 6
IV
In order to provide for economic cooperation and coordination at the level of
both trade and output planning within the bloc, a Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA) was formed in January 1949 by the Soviet Union and the East-
Central European countries: East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ru-
mania, Bulgaria, and Albania. Neither Communist China nor the Asian satellites
(Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam) are members of CEMA. Com-
munist China, however, sends an observer to its deliberations.
CEMA has advisory and consultative functions. It makes recommendations,
but lacks executive authority to enforce them. It has no fixed headquarters and
meets roughly once a year in the capital of a different member country. At its
sessions, CEMA examines the recommendations of its expert commissions, now some
thirty-odd in number and of a permanent character since 1956, each of which has
now its headquarters in the country best suited for its specific work. Thus, the
Soviet Union is host to CEMA's heavy metallurgy commission, Czechoslovakia
to the machinery-construction commission, East Germany to the chemical commis-
sion, Poland to the coal commission, Rumania to the oil and natural gas commis-
sion, Bulgaria to the agricultural commission, etc. In each commission sit permanent
representatives of the ministries and planning authorities concerned in the member
countries.
During the first years of CEMA's activity, which coincided with the first plans
of development of the East-Central European countries-i.e., from I949 to I953-the
essential method of coordination used in the bloc was the establishment of long-
term trade agreements designed to guarantee the minimum supplies of basic mate-
rials needed for the carrying out of the independendy-drawn national output plans.
Most of these long-term trade agreements were concluded between i95o and 1952,
and CEMA was more or less instrumental in their preparation. During the same
period, technical and scientific cooperation started to develop in the bloc through
interchange of technical documentation, technical consultation, exchange of experts,
training of technicians and workmen, and the like.
After the death of Stalin, the question of developing the "socialist division of
0 According to a Rumanian account of the conference mentioned in note 15 supra, the Soviet dele-
gate G. M. Sorokin, of the Moscow Economic Institute, after having noticed that the "international prices
do not express world values" (?) since they are "influenced by the monopolies," added that "the problem
of the formation of prices on the socialist world market is not yet clarified theoretically." Angel,
Dezbatere siintifiS pe tema diviziunii internationale a muncii in cadrul sistemuli Socialist mondial
[Scientific Debate on the Question of the International Division oj Labor in the Framework ol the
World Socialist System], in is PROLEMsE ECONOCE 13X (958). We can readily agree with Mr.
Sorokin on this point.
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labor" received increased attention from numerous bloc quarters. During the short
period of the so-called "new course" (1953-55), economic coordination was envisaged
not only at the level of trade as during the preceding period, but also at the level
of output. Thus, the activities of CEMA were to increase in depth and facilitate as
much as possible the dovetailing of the second long-term development plans of the
East European countries, scheduled to start in January 1956, at the same time as the
Sixth Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union. While these plans were still in the initial
stage of implementation, the upheavals in Hungary and in Poland in the fall of that
same year threw them out of gear and forced substantial changes in the basic design.
The Soviet Union itself stopped short of the completion of its Sixth Five-Year
Plan and shifted to a new Seven-Year-Plan for the period 1959-65. The objectives
of CEMA were then proclaimed to be not only to help in the coordination of the
new output plans for i96i-65, the third long-term plan period in East Europe, but also
to examine and suggest appropriate means for fitting together the plans for raw
materials, fuel and power, capital construction, and transportation for the whole
fifteen-year period extending from 1961 to 1975.
Within this broad framework, what has CEMA actually accomplished? While
there has been much talk about the socialist division of labor, various factors have
either prevented this division from occurring or have at best rendered it highly hap-
hazard. The intrabloc division of labor has progressed little, because each of the
countries of the bloc has attempted to build the same structure of production as
that of the Soviet Union. Each has conceived and continues to conceive its in-
dustrialization as a process in which the national heavy (or producers' goods) in-
dustries must develop at a faster rate than the consumers' goods industries, regard-
less of the impact this policy may have on the standard of living. Each country
has held dogmatically to the Marxian schema of "enlarged reproduction," positing
that certain branches must develop faster than others, whatever the underlying en-
dowments of factors might be. However, since 1955, it has been conceded in all
these countries that each need not develop all the branches of the heavy industry,
and that cooperation is necessary and possible without changing in any way the
basic tenets of enlarged reproduction within each economy.
But at this point, various other key factors enter into play against any systematic
division of labor. One of these factors is the impossibility of establishing some
meaningful relation between the distorted interior prices and the international prices,
a question which we have examined above in part three. Another factor is the in-
built tendency of each plant, industry, sector, region, or country in the area to
ensure its supplies and thus accumulate stocks or even produce spare parts or any
other goods in order to break the bottlenecks which would prevent the achievement
of the main economic goal-namely, the fulfillment and even overfulfillment of the
output plan. Self-sufficiency becomes a virtue within a planning system whose
basic emphasis is on the fulfillment of given physical-output targets.
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Another obvious factor which has operated against division of labor is the special
role of the Soviet Union, given its size, economic potential, and political influence
and its understandable reluctance to agree to any scheme which would imply a
weakening of its control over its own output plan or a sharing of its investible
resources ("accumulations") according to the bloc-wide endowments of factors.
Hence, the lack of executive powers of CEMA and the necessity of achieving each
specific division of labor via a bilateral or at best a triangular arrangement.
As a result of all these elements, the division of labor at the level of output
ultimately presents a somewhat haphazard pattern, since it is shaped by political
and technical-engineering factors, and not by cost and price considerations. It is
stated now that by i96o, thanks to the help of CEMA, specialization will involve
ninety types of machines, twenty-seven metallurgical products, twenty-five chemical
products, and so on. Each of the permanent commissions of experts examines labori-
ously each type of product, taking into account each plant available, and recommends
a specific technical-engineering apportionment among the members. The experts
propose, CEMA recommends, and the various countries involved implement, if they
so decide, the recommendations made via bilateral agreements. Thus, in certain cases,
given plants in a given country are earmarked to produce for the whole bloc. For
example, the Zemag Works in Zeitz, East Germany, manufactures agglutination
machinery (for coal briquets, sawdust, ores, etc.), the Thilman Works in Magde-
bourg produces large cement factories, and the Frderbrficken Gerdtebau in Leuch-
lammer manufactures coal-stripping and removing machinery. In some cases, out-
puts of given specifications (e.g., trucks of five or ten tons) will be produced in
this or that country, viz. Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In other cases, cooperation
consists in the establishment of a joint company in which one country furnishes the
raw materials, the other the industrial facilities to exploit them, viz. the Hungarian-
Rumanian company Romagchim for joint exploitation of the Rumanian natural gas.
This laborious bloc-wide technical-engineering apportionment, however, can be
either obstructed or rendered of doubtful value if two important countries develop
suddenly a very broad framework of bilateral cooperation. Thus, the Soviet-Czecho-
slovak economic relations were suddenly organized on the basis of extensive co-
operation in a group of key industries following a bilateral agreement announced
on January 29, i 95 7 .17 It is difficult to know exactly in what measure such agree-
ments complete or cancel the bloc-wide apportionments already suggested by CEMA
commissions. However, it is certain that future bloc-wide apportionments will have
to be adjusted to the agreement already reached bilaterally by two of the most im-
portant members of the bloc.
The transition from the attempted- coordination at the level of trade, which
characterized the period up to 1953, to attempted coordination at the level of output,
which started from 1955 onward, has had rather limited results to date. The output
plans continue on parallel lines, and the planners reluctantly envisage any broad in-
"T See Economies Joined by Soviet, Czechs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1957, p- 14, col. 4-
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trabloc division of labor. If, as far as trade is concerned, each bloc country affirms
that it always stands ready to buy from a bloc member rather than from a nonbloc
country, even if the bloc country's prices are slightly higher and the time of de-
livery somewhat longer, the inbuilt autarchic tendency of each planned economy
plays strongly against systematic cooperation in the current period, just as in the
preceding one. The East European planner will accept willingly credits, technical
assistance, or scientific cooperation, but will try to keep his domestic plan, as much
as feasible, on an all-round basis and under his rigid control.
V
i. The monopoly of foreign trade has proven to be, for each Soviet-type economy,
an important political-defensive and offensive tool. As far as defensive purposes
are concerned, the monopoly has insured maximum protection against capitalist
competition and maximum assistance to the national plan, since it has made the
imports from nonbloc sources dependent on the plan needs and has tailored the
exports to meet the needs of payments arising from the given imports.
2. As an instrument of political attack and offensive, the monopoly has insured
the possibility, especially for the Soviet Union, of shifting rapidly from one market
to another, of adjusting purchases and sales to political considerations, and of max-
imizing the impact of its operation, especially when the international market is in
distress. In fact, the more unsettled the world market is, the more effective the
monopoly appears as an instrument of commercial warfare. Furthermore, the more
delicate the balance of power in the so-called noncommitted countries, the more
powerful looms the capacity of the Soviet Union to adjust its trade to its political
objectives. It is interesting to note that in periods of international tension, there is
always talk of counteracting the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade by creating a
similar foreign trade monopoly either on a national or an international scale. How-
ever, such a move is extremely difficult to fit within the framework of free-enterprise
economies, and no concrete steps have thus far been taken in this direction."8
1' Mr. James Reston recently stated that a high official of the United States Government has declared
the following: "We have been discussing quietly inside our own government, for six months the need
to establish an overseas trade monopoly to compete with the Soviet monopoly on equal terms, but this
is so foreign to our normal way of doing business that we have not mentioned it in public." N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 5958, p. 17, cols. 3-5- Writing again on this problem a week later, Mr. Reston added that "men
high in this Government" argue that "the United States may have to go to a radical system of state
trading overseas, or even to combined state trading with the other free countries in order to counter
Moscow's capacity to trade where it likes, at any prices it likes, for political advantage." Id., Dec. 7, 1958,
p. E8, col. 4.
Let me note that these are not radical new ideas--though they may become radical new policies. G.
Caillaux stated in 1931 in the French Senate that the only way of meeting the danger arising from the
Soviet foreign trade monopoly was "to meet the adversary with his own arms." Caillaux suggested that
France should decide "that nothing be sold or bought from the Soviets but through the intermediary of an
Office whose task would be to watch that there will be balance between purchases and sales. . . . The
same Office," added Caillaux, "purchasing directly for our importers, would sell them the acquired
products at the prices prevailing on our market." The idea was soon taken over by Loucheur who sug-
gested that the proposed solution be enlarged and that an International Office of Trade with the Soviet
Union be formed. The Office would purchase from the Russians and "apportion the goods among the
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3. The pursuit of industrialization in East Eur6pe and the organization of these
economies on the Soviet model (centralized planning and monopoly of foreign trade)
has encouraged, to a degree, development of intrabloc trade. Deliberate industrializa-
tion has facilitated the import of raw materials from the Soviet Union and the export
toward the Soviet market of manufactured goods. Trade has further increased,
thanks to the deliberate choice made by the various trading agencies involved, in
favor of the intrabloc market instead of the extrabloc markets. But on the other
hand, the attempt to develop each economy on an all-round basis and the manipula-
tion by each of their own domestic prices has rendered the attempts toward a broad
division of labor more implausible. The division of labor has been a hit-and-miss
proposition in which, as stated, technology and engineering are supposed to pro-
vide answers which distorted costs and prices cannot give.
4. Given conclusion three above, can we conclude that "the less the degree of
dependence of a national economy in its ordinary operations on trade with other
countries, the less, caeteris paribus, will be the difficulties of setting up and operating
a comprehensive national economic plan"?19 This assertion is certainly true in
general. It is easier to set up a domestic all-round plan by reducing foreign trade
to a minimum. But on the other hand, Soviet-type planning, with its deliberate
priorities and branch emphasis, creates enormous imbalances in the economy. These
imbalances create, in turn, a serious need for trade. Certain imports are rapidly
needed in order to break various bottlenecks, and exports are needed as an outlet for
certain surpluses (even such surpluses as obsolete military equipment). Thus, the
intrabloc market can and does play the role of a cushion for the imbalances of the
plan of the most important economy of the bloc, that of the Soviet Union.
5. The Soviet-bloc economies indicate that the intrabloc trade is "a new type of
trade" in which the partners enjoy "full equality," in contrast with the relations pre-
vailing in the capitalist world markets. The facts adduced to prove these asser-
tions are either of a very limited import or are completely irrelevant. It is stated,
for instance, that (a) equality arises because the clearing operations are carried
simultaneously by the appropriate organisms of both partners, and not only by
one of the two partners; (b) equality is insured by the fact that "the law of value
does not operate anarchically," but that it is kept under control, and prices are
established on the basis of "mutual interest and voluntary understanding."2 Evi-
dently, the fact that both partners keep the record of their operations is rather a
simple procedure of double-checking than a sign of equality. As far as prices are
concerned, the fact that they are kept stable or not is irrelevant to the question of
participating countries following a given scale based on their needs." . A. STOUPINiTzKY, STATuT INTER-
NATIONAL DE L'URSS PTAT COMMERIANT [INTERNATIONAL STATUTE Op THE USSR, CONIMERCIAL STATE]
r6z-62 (I936).
"' JACoB VINER, The Influence of National Economic Planning on Commercial Policy, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT 85 (952).
"o IKONNIKOV, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 427 et seq.; see also KOVRIZHYN-YH, FRUMKIN, & POZDNIAKOV,
op. at. supra note i, at 37 et seq.
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equality and mutual interest. Actually, the procedure of omitting prices in the
basic trade agreements and of leaving them to be decided afterwards in the contracts
concluded by the export and import agencies often places the weaker country at the
complete mercy of the stronger partner. It is characteristic that in the trade with
nonbloc countries, the question of the prices set by the Soviet agencies has always
been one of the sore points of the trade with the Soviet Union. These prices have
quite often proven higher than the international prices for goods of lower quality,
with the result that many countries have had serious difficulties in implementing the
trade agreement.
